Ontario Police Linked to Israeli Spyware in Citizen Lab Report | Privacy Concerns Grow

Ontario Police Using Israeli Spyware: Citizen Lab Report Reveals Expanding Surveillance Ecosystem

A new investigation from the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto has exposed potential links between Ontario’s provincial police and an Israeli spyware firm known for military-grade cyber tools. The findings suggest that law enforcement in Canada is quietly building a growing and largely unregulated surveillance infrastructure, raising red flags about privacy, civil liberties, and democratic oversight.

The report centers on Paragon Solutions, an Israel-based company that develops Graphite, a spyware product capable of infiltrating smartphones to access messages, calls, and real-time device data. Citizen Lab researchers uncovered a technical connection between Paragon’s infrastructure and an entity using the address of the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), sparking concern over the extent of spyware use within Canadian police forces.

What Is Graphite and Who Is Paragon Solutions?

Paragon Solutions was established by former Israeli intelligence personnel and quickly positioned itself as a global player in the government-exclusive spyware market. The company’s primary offering, Graphite, is designed to covertly hack mobile devices, retrieve encrypted messages, monitor calls, capture photos, and track location data—essentially granting full remote control of a target’s phone.

Unlike the better-known NSO Group, makers of Pegasus spyware, Paragon operates with less public scrutiny. But both companies market to the same clientele: government agencies, military intelligence, and law enforcement. The tools are advertised as solutions for high-risk, high-priority cases involving terrorism and organized crime.

However, as recent history has shown, such powerful technology is vulnerable to abuse. In 2023, Graphite was used to target an Italian journalist and activists advocating for migrant rights. Following public outcry, Paragon suspended its contract with the Italian government, though it declined to detail the circumstances.

A spokesperson for the company said that all customers must agree to strict terms prohibiting misuse, including surveillance of journalists and human rights defenders. Yet enforcement mechanisms remain opaque, and there is no independent oversight ensuring that those terms are upheld.

The Canadian Connection: Technical Clues Point to Ontario

Citizen Lab’s report, published in March 2025, outlines what researchers describe as “possible links” between Paragon and Ontario-based policing entities. Among the most notable findings:

• A technical indicator tied to Paragon’s spyware infrastructure was linked to a domain associated with an Ontario address used by the Ontario Provincial Police.
• Public court records reveal that the OPP used a surveillance tool also in use by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) during a 2019 investigation, suggesting cooperation or shared technology.
• A 2023 ruling from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice referenced a joint investigation by Toronto Police Service (TPS) and York Regional Police, in which investigators “considered” the use of spyware categorized in Canada as an On-Device Investigative Tool (ODIT).
• A search warrant application from 2023 obtained by Citizen Lab showed that TPS had secured access to an ODIT and sought judicial authorization to intercept messages from encrypted messaging apps, such as Signal or WhatsApp.

These developments point to an expanding surveillance capability across multiple police forces in Ontario—not limited to federal agencies like the RCMP.

OPP Response: Legal Compliance, But No Denial

In response to questions about the Citizen Lab findings, the Ontario Provincial Police issued a carefully worded statement that neither confirmed nor denied the use of spyware. Instead, it emphasized adherence to Canadian laws governing surveillance:

“In Canada, the interception of private communications requires judicial authorization in accordance with the Criminal Code, and is only used to advance serious criminal investigations. Such authorizations are subject to stringent criteria relating to designated offences defined in the Criminal Code.

The OPP uses investigative tools and techniques in full compliance with the laws of Canada, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Releasing information about specific investigative techniques and technology could jeopardize active investigations and threaten public and officer safety.”

While the OPP insists on legal compliance, the lack of transparency fuels skepticism. Without direct confirmation, there is no way for the public or even Parliament to fully understand the scope of spyware use in provincial policing.

A Pattern of Secrecy: RCMP’s 2022 Admission

This is not the first time spyware has been linked to Canadian authorities. In 2022, the RCMP confirmed in a public statement that it had used spyware to infiltrate mobile devices, describing it as a last resort for complex investigations where conventional surveillance had failed.

The agency stated that all spyware deployments required judicial approval and were limited to high-priority criminal cases, including those involving national security. Yet privacy advocates criticized the RCMP for failing to notify the public or Parliament about these activities in real time.

Following the RCMP’s disclosure, a parliamentary ethics committee recommended stronger oversight of digital surveillance, increased transparency, and a modernization of privacy laws. None of those recommendations were turned into law.

Canada’s Legal Grey Zone: No Regulation for Government Spyware

Despite the advanced capabilities of spyware tools like Graphite, Canada still lacks dedicated legislation to regulate their use by law enforcement. The Criminal Code and Charter provide some basic protections, but do not account for the complexity and secrecy involved in digital intrusions.

The term “ODIT” has become a euphemism for spyware in Canada, but this rebranding has not reduced the risks. ODITs can access everything on a person’s phone—including messages, location data, documents, and even camera or microphone feeds—without alerting the user.

In most cases, the public only learns about these tools after they’ve been deployed. There is no mandatory public reporting system, no independent watchdog, and no standardized audit mechanism to track how often spyware is used, by whom, or against whom.

International Comparisons: Spyware Under Scrutiny

Globally, other democratic countries have begun reckoning with the risks of spyware:

• In France and Spain, the use of Pegasus spyware on journalists and politicians led to multiple investigations and calls for EU-wide regulation.
• Mexico acknowledged widespread abuse of surveillance tools by its government, with spyware used against human rights defenders and opposition leaders.
• United States agencies have reportedly tested Pegasus and similar tools, but use is restricted under legal and policy frameworks that prohibit targeting Americans without court authorization.

Canada, by contrast, has yet to establish any clear policy or oversight structure specific to spyware. That gap has allowed agencies at all levels—federal, provincial, and municipal—to quietly build surveillance capabilities without public debate.

Growing Public Concern and Expert Warnings

Kate Robertson, a senior researcher at Citizen Lab and legal expert on surveillance issues, warns that the findings in Ontario reflect a national pattern of quiet escalation.

“What these findings show is that there is a widening gap in public awareness regarding the extent to which spyware technology is being used in Canada. These findings raise important questions for the government and privacy regulators about what technologies are being used and how decisions are being made,” Robertson said.

She emphasized the urgent need for law reform to protect civil liberties, establish clear limits on government hacking powers, and ensure that any use of spyware is accountable to independent oversight.

Risks to Press Freedom, Human Rights, and Democracy

The deployment of spyware—even with judicial approval—poses significant threats to journalistic freedom, attorney-client confidentiality, and the right to privacy.

Spyware operates in secrecy, often without notifying the subject. Its broad reach means that not just targets but anyone in their network—friends, family, colleagues—can become collateral surveillance. For journalists, this means sources may be exposed. For activists, this creates a chilling effect on dissent.

While police may argue that spyware is essential for serious crime investigations, the same tools have repeatedly been used globally to suppress political opposition, monitor protest movements, and intimidate civil society.

Without transparency, it is impossible to know whether similar abuses are happening—or will happen—in Canada.

What Needs to Change: Legal and Institutional Reforms

Experts and advocacy organizations are calling for immediate action from the federal government, including:

• New legislation to regulate spyware use across all levels of Canadian law enforcement.
• Mandatory public reporting of spyware usage statistics and targets (with redactions for ongoing investigations).
• Independent oversight bodies with authority to audit, investigate, and sanction misuse.
• Clear legal standards defining when spyware can be used, by whom, and for what purpose.
• Special protections for sensitive groups, including journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, and medical professionals.

Conclusion: The Window for Accountability Is Closing

Citizen Lab’s report is not just a revelation—it’s a warning. Canadian police forces, including the OPP and Toronto Police, are either using or preparing to use powerful spyware tools capable of penetrating the most private parts of people’s digital lives.

While some legal processes are in place, they are outdated, opaque, and insufficient for the surveillance era we now live in. As more police agencies gain access to these tools, the risk of misuse increases—and the ability to detect or prevent it decreases.

Without strong legal reforms and real oversight, Canada risks drifting into a surveillance state by default. Transparency, accountability, and the public’s right to know must be prioritized before this growing ecosystem of spyware becomes permanent.

Controversial Israeli spyware allegedly linked to Ontario police (VIDEO)

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